Russow: Response

Davidson, and R. G. Frey, who seem to appeal to the
Wittgensteinian tradition, argue for a more narrow thesis, viz.,
that animals cannot have certain sorts of mental states,
although they may well possess other conscious states.
Carruthers argues that animals have no conscious states, and
does link consciousness with the ability to use a natural
language, but does not explicitly invoke Wittgenstein. In fact,
Leahy is the only appropriate target I am aware of, in that he
explicitly appeals to Wittgenstein in his arguments to show
that animals lack "awareness." Absent further references from
Singer, it is difficult to know exactly to whom he wishes to
attribute the more extreme claim.
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Prof. Russow invokes a distinction regarding the
relevance of language to mind that she believes is
overlooked in my paper. First, there is the thesis that
some mental states involve concepts that seem to be
too complex to be captured by creatures without
language; e. g., dogs might have expectations, but dogs
cannot expect to be taken out next Wednesday. The
second thesis is that language may be necessary in order
to have certain types of mental states. Among Russow's
examples here is understanding what it is for a certain
proposition to be true. Clearly, such an understanding
requires language. So, restrictions of the first kind deny
certain states to animals due to conceptual complexity,
while restrictions of the second kind restrict which types
of states might reasonably be attributed to animals.
Now, this is an interesting distinction, but I don't
believe it was overlooked-at least not by me. Russow
says that Wittgenstein presents the relevance of
language to mentality in these two distinct ways. This
may be, but there is little evidence that he had this
distinction in mind. Indeed, in the passage from the
Investigations cited in the first section of my paper,
Wittgenstein lumps together restrictions due to
complexity of conceptual content (dog cannot believe
his master will come the day after tomorrow but does
have other beliefs) with restrictions of type (a dog
cannot be hopeful).
Nevertheless, Russow's distinction is a meaningful
one. To exemplify the distinction, she correctly observes
that Stich focuses on possible belief contents, while
Malcolm, Davidson, and others are more interested in
which types ofmental states animals can have. However,

2 We should remember, however, that for Wittgenstein,
these psychological states should not be thought of as inner,
private events--either for animals or humans.
3 For further discussion of the concept of deception, see
Russow and other papers in Mitchell and Thompson (1986).
4 In "How to Change Your Mind" (Dennett, 1978),
Dennett argues that animals can have beliefs, but not opinions.
They can come to believe, but not decide, assent, or judge. In
later discussions (e.g., Dennett 1991, ch 8) he analyzes the
role language plays in determining what the content of our
beliefs could be.
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while Stich alone focuses explicitly on conceptual
content, his argument is against the possibility of animal
belief (indeed, all belief) generally. He does not argue
that while dogs cannot have beliefs about algebra, for
example, they can have beliefs about bones. According
to him, they can't have beliefs about anything, which is
also the conclusion to Davidson's arguments. Stich does
have different reasons than Davidson for denying belief
states to animals, but if either Stich's or Davidson's
arguments succeed, beliefs are a type of mental state that
animals cannot have. l Thus, the distinction between the
two theses about the relevance of language to animal
mentality appears to be somewhat blurred.
The difficulty of maintaining Russow's distinction is
perhaps best illustrated by one of her own examples of
the second kind of restriction on animal mentality (the
type of state restriction). An animal might understand
what it is for a certain state of affairs to obtain but not
understand what it is for a statement to be true. This seems
obvious enough. But there's no special type of mental
state at stake here. Animals can understand some things
arid not others. Perhaps animals have no beliefs about
truth, but a beliefabout truth is not a special type ofmental
state, it's just a belief with a very special content-a
content too complex to be held by most animals. The
distinction, then, between the two theses restricting
animal mentality is quite fuzzy indeed. I suspect this is
why Wittgenstein did not make much of it.

Russow correctly points out that the priority of
language is often invoked in arguments about whether
or not animals have certain kinds of moral standing.
Questions about animal mentality need to be answered
in order to settle such issues. I agree entirely. Whether
or not a creature can be said to have interests or rights
does seem to depend on getting answers to complex
questions about animal mentaIity.2 However, the virtue
of Diamond's conception of moral community is
precisely that it does not depend on getting answers to
all of these questions, important as they may be. Many
facets of both animal and human psychology may
remain mysterious to us, but this need not leave us
morally paralyzed.
Notes
I Of course there are important differences in the reasons
that Stich and Davidson use to support this conclusion. Stich
centers on specifiability of belief contents, while Davidson
contends that having beliefs presupposes having the concept
of belief, which in turn requires having the concepts of truth
and falsity (see his "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries into Truth
andlnterpretaJion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.)

2 For an interesting discussion from the point of view of
philosophy of mind on attributing "interests" to animals and
its relevance to animal liberation, see George Graham's
Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell,
1988, pp. 186-190.
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